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This essay has benefited frommany readers and listeners, including graduate students in a
course on trauma in fall 2001 and the participants of the first annual Bloomington Eighteenth-
Century StudiesWorkshop inMay 2002, as well as audiences at lectures in the German
departments at New York University, Johns Hopkins University, and PrincetonUniversity. In
particular, I would like to thankMichel Chaouli, Elliott Schreiber, and DrorWahrman for their
rich criticism and ideas.
1. For the English context, see DrorWahrman,TheMaking of theModern Self: Identity and
Culture in Eighteenth-CenturyBritain (NewHaven, Conn., 2004), and Deidre Shauna Lynch,The
Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of InnerMeaning (Chicago, 1998).
For a three-step development of notions of selfhood in France between 1700, 1770, and the early
1800s, see Jan Goldstein, “Mutations of the Self in the Old Regime and Postrevolutionary France:
FromAme toMoi to LeMoi,” in Biographies of Scientiﬁc Objects, ed. LorraineDaston (Chicago,
2000), pp. 86–117. For the German context, see Fritz Breithaupt, “Goethe and the Ego,”Goethe
Yearbook 11 (2002): 77–109.
The Invention of Trauma in German
Romanticism
Fritz Breithaupt
What is the promise of trauma? Or, why was the concept of trauma in-
vented? Which constellations of discourse made such an invention or dis-
covery desirable, useable, or at least understandable? And, what are the
consequences of the formulation of a new idea, such as that of trauma?
The following text traces how the concept of trauma emerged as a re-
sponse to a certain understanding of the self in romanticism. The new no-
tion of self and selfhood is dated to the years around 1770, at least within
the English, French, and German contexts.1 Prior to 1770 selfhood seems
not to have been a general concern (unlike notions of identity and belong-
ing). However, around and after 1770 selfhood becomes a prerequisite for
the modern man.2 In fact, the very notion of le moi or das Ich gains sudden
and rapid popularity in just a few years. While there are some common-
2. For the implications of this transition, see the foundational text by Niklas Luhmann,
“Individuum, Individualita¨t, Individualismus,”Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik, 4 vols.
(Frankfurt, 1989), 3:149–258.
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3. In the past decade, several scholars have added to Charles Taylor’s insight that the model for
the self and its interiority since the eighteenth century was the ﬁgure of the child; see Charles
Taylor, Sources of the Self: TheMaking of theModern Identity (Cambridge,Mass., 1989); Carolyn
Steedman, Strange Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea of Human Interiority, 1780–1930
(Cambridge,Mass., 1995); LarryWolﬀ, “When I Imagine a Child: The Idea of Childhood and the
Philosophy of Memory in the Enlightenment,”Eighteenth-Century Studies 31 (Summer 1998): 377–
401; and Adriana S. Bezanque´n, “Childhood, Identity, and Human Science in the Enlightenment,”
HistoryWorkshop Journal 57 (Spring 2004): 35–57.
4. The soldiers usually only ﬁgure as icons of empathy when they allegorize a nation’s loss; see
John RichardWatson,Romanticism andWar: A Study of British Romantic PeriodWriters and the
NapoleonicWars (Houndsmill, 2003), pp. 23–38.
alities between the developments in these countries, the German period of
Sturm und Drang radicalizes the notion of selfhood to such a degree that
the battle cry for the self in this period turns into a lamentation about its
unachievability. Instead of celebrating their genius, originality, singularity,
or autonomy, the Germans only recognize that they cannot meet the de-
mand set by the notionofdas Ich.Thus, insteadof gaininga self, theGerman
romantics suﬀer from their perceived weakness in failing to accomplish the
creation of a self. In short, the self exists as self-compulsion (Ich-Zwang).
This article examines how it is in this context that the idea of trauma
comes about as a possible remedy for the impossibility of the self. Trauma
is invented where it is needed, where it holds a promise. This promise, as
we will see, is the promise to turn weakness into strength, to turn theweak-
ness of not having a self into the very self that is sought. This may also
explain the sudden emergence of childhood as the model of selfhood in the
late eighteenth century; the child’s weakness and absolute reliance on the
outside turns out to be the condition of possibility for selfhood.3 Insofar as
trauma responds to the promise of strength, it is not governed by the au-
thenticity of one’s experiences. Hence the simulation of trauma, for ex-
ample by constructing false accounts of abuse, is not an accident, but part
of its structure.
The proposed origin of trauma may explain what otherwise would be
hard to explain when we look back at the history of the idea of trauma from
a point in time after two world wars and after the Holocaust (and yet with-
out being beyond it); trauma was not an easy condition to detect. Appar-
ently, the suﬀering of trauma is not available for direct observation. It is
striking, for example, how little empathy early psychologists had for trau-
matized veterans of the Napoleonic wars.4 The psychologists of the time
Fritz Breithaupt (fbreitha@indiana.edu) is associate professor of
Germanic studies and director of West European studies at Indiana University.
He is author of a book on Goethe, Jenseits der Bilder: Goethes Politik der
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5. It was already an advance when Dominique Larrey, a military surgeon in Napoleon’s army,
described what we would call shell shock as a form of insanity; see Anthony Babington, Shell-
Shock: A History of the Changing Attitudes toWar Neurosis (London, 1997), p. 8. For the
assumption of a male hysteria in nineteenth-century shell-shock psychiatry, see Elaine Showalter,
The FemaleMalady:Women,Madness, and English Culture, 1830–1980 (London, 1985), p. 172.
6. Trauma simply did not ﬁt into the picture of the observateurs because they remained ﬁxated
on the perfectibility of man; see Bezanque´n, “Childhood, Identity, and Human Science in the
Enlightenment.”
7. OnRadcliﬀe’s text, see Elisabeth Bronfen,The Knotted Subject: Hysteria and Its Discontents
(Princeton, N.J., 1998). OnWordsworth and the wounds of memory, see Aleida Assmann,
Erinnerungsra¨ume: Formen undWandlungen des kulturellen Geda¨chtnisses (Munich, 1999),
pp. 89–113.
8. In eﬀect, this study suggests that the origin of the concept of trauma should be located
considerably earlier than Ruth Leys does in her rich and complex account of the history of the
clinical notion of trauma. In fact, the early history of the notion of trauma leadsmore directly to
Freud’s later work on trauma than to the British empirical doctors’ discovery of the shock
condition; see Ruth Leys,Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago, 2000).
tended to attribute the “anxiety” or “stupidity” of shell-shocked soldiers to
a deﬁcient upbringing that supposedly failed to provide them with the sta-
bility and strength they needed. According to these accounts, war only
brought to the surface what was already present—or more precisely, not
present—within the soldiers: masculinity. And war, in this psychological
sense, was perceived as a nonevent because it did not change the soldiers in
a signiﬁcant way but only brought their weak, melancholic inner consti-
tutions to the surface.5 In a similar way, the French institution meant to
study selfhood—the Society ofObservers ofMan (Socie´te´ desObservateurs
de l’Homme)—completely failed to take trauma into consideration when
it examined the famous wild boy fromAveyron. Instead of considering that
the harsh conditions of the abandoned child’s years in the forestmighthave
traumatized the child, most of its members declared the child to have been
born stupid and thus uneducateable.6
The understanding of trauma does not come from amode of direct and
immediate observation. Instead of tracing empirical data around 1800, the
following essay pursues the promise inherent in trauma as revealed by early
texts within German romanticism. Certainly, phenomena of trauma are
witnessed in many places during the age of romanticism as well (one need
only consider Ann Radcliﬀe’s The Romance of the Forest or Wordsworth’s
The Thorn and The Prelude).7However, as far as I can see, the drive towards
a conceptual and therefore operative understanding of what we nowwould
call trauma took place within the new German and Austrian literature of
empirical psychology.8
Empirical psychology comes about and begins to shape a discourse of
its own at the junction of two seemingly opposite forces: a positive reeval-
uation of the impact of memory and the acknowledgment that memory is
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9. As LarryWolﬀ put it: “On the one hand, the empirical psychology pioneered by John Locke,
and developed by DavidHume and the abbe´ de Condillac in the eighteenth century, produced a
radical reevaluation of memory, in its relation to perception and experience. On the other hand,
the revolutionarymodern art of autobiography, as inaugurated by Rousseau’sConfessions,
authorized an altogether new deployment of the art of memory in the service of literary self-
fashioning” (Wolﬀ, “When I Imagine a Child,” p. 378).
10. Locke is, of course, the ﬁrst to bind the fate of the self ’s identity tomemory. Hume could be
seen as the ﬁrst skeptic. See Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp. 143–76.
11. See StuartWalker Strickland, “The Ideology of Self-Knowledge and the Practice of Self-
Experimentation,”Eighteenth-Century Studies 31 (Summer 1998): 453–71.
subject to literary ﬁctionalization.9 Memory becomes suspect or, put pos-
itively, productive. It is at this junction of memory and ﬁctionalization that
the psychological speculations of Locke, Hume, Condillac, and Herder,
which centered on identity and stability (even if skeptically as in Hume),10
give way to a new mode that blends self-observation, self-fashioning, and
self-experimentation.11 Fictionalization and thus literature are an essential
component of this new discipline of the 1780s and 1790s, as evidenced by
Karl Philipp Moritz, the father of modern psychology, who edited and col-
lectedmany life stories to produce psychological accounts of themandwho
wrote the ﬁrst “psychological novel,” which attempts to synthesize these
accounts by observing his own past as if he were running an experiment.
And again, as we will see, within this experiment lies a hope, a promise.
There are three basic arguments that structure this paper: (1) In its initial
foundation, empirical psychology is less a science for understanding the
human mind than a technique for transforming human beings—speciﬁ-
cally, for transforming humanweakness into human strength. (2) Thebirth
ofmodern psychology is intimately linkedwith the productionof its object,
namely, the self. More speciﬁcally, empirical psychology is ﬁrst of all a tech-
nology for producing (a speciﬁc) self that could become the object of an
empirical science. In its basic structure, this self is an institution that grants
selfsameness to itself and its acts. (3)The institutionalizationof the self relies
on memory, which allows both the repetition and the reversal of the past.
It is by means of memory that the wounds of the past, if they have not
succeeded in killing the individual, can become the most important assets
of the self. In this sense, trauma is the condition of possibility for the self.
As we will see, eighteenth-century psychology was still able to view trauma
as a positive possibility for transformation, whereas later psychology in-
creasingly views trauma as a place without escape—the self as a prison. In
this paper, the witness for “positive trauma” is Moritz. E. T. A. Hoﬀmann
is the witness for the prison of repetition compulsion (Wiederholungs-
zwang). Honore´ de Balzac leads us to consider the cure for trauma. In
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12. See Ju¨rgenHabermas,The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge,Mass.,
1989).
13. Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel have developed this logic to its perfection; see the famous
account by Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe,Typography:Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, ed. Christopher
Fynsk (Cambridge,Mass., 1989), pp. 208–35.
conclusion, we will reﬂect upon what has come to be known in recent de-
cades as trauma studies.
1. Psychology as a Technology of Reversal
The story that is often told about the birth of empirical psychology in
the late eighteenth century goes as follows: Once upon a time, there was a
smart but poor fellow, a pauper in a world full of princes. He was the
middle-class man. And because he lacked the wealth and nobility of the
aristocrats, he staked his claim in the world vis-a`-vis the privileged class by
means of his intellect, telling stories of his weakness and misery, until all
began to listen to his tales of woe. Ranging from mere sensibility to idio-
syncrasy and from anxiety to the pathological, it was the psychological that
manifested the presence of this new man. And then, surprisingly, this new
man’s weakness, with which he presented his privacy to the public, turned
out to be his advantage. The new man claimed that his weaknesses made
himmore humanandmore humane and thus better able tomake intelligent
choices, resist bad inﬂuences, be more responsible than others, and thus,
ultimately, to be stronger. And everyone started to believe in the new
middle-class man (and woman, too, for she is weak and human as well).12
The cloudy spot at the core of this story, namely the transformation of
the weak man into the strong man, is found in most stories that deal with
the rise of themiddle-classman.How can self-conﬁdence, aswell as outside
recognition, emerge from a state of weakness? Not only have later scholars
recognized this cloudy spot, but eighteenth-century thinkers themselves
provided an array of techniques of reversal that would make such a rise of
the weak plausible. It would not be far oﬀ themark to characterize the eigh-
teenth century in terms of its obsession with technologies of reversal, rang-
ing from theories and practices of political revolution to the countless
eighteenth-century tragedies in which the dying heroes are celebrated as
winners,13 from Pietist conversions, where the confessing sinner is uplifted
into grace, to fantasies about female leadership in the Amazon state.
At its beginning, the psychological is nothing but a call for reversal. That
is, the notion of the psychological as a whole comes about as the recipient
of the demand to give a shape, a recognizable form to a process of an in-
dividual’s reversal. However, as a technology of reversal, the psychological
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14. See JacquesDerrida,Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago,
1996).
15. Encyclopedia Britannica, or a Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, Compiled upon a New Plan
(Edinburgh, 1771), s.v. “metaphysics,” p. 178. See also Douwe Draaisma,Metaphors of Memory: A
History of Ideas about theMind, trans. Paul Vincent (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 68–83.
16. For a rich body of material dealing with the new interest in dreams and dislocations of the
self, see Doris Kaufmann, “Dreams and Self-Consciousness:Mapping theMind in the Late
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,” in Biographies of Scientiﬁc Objects, pp. 67–86.
17. On the logic of testing, see Avital Ronell, “Proving Grounds: On Nietzsche and the Test
Drive,”Modern Language Notes 118 (Apr. 2003): 653–69.
is a bad starting point insofar as it has no preexisting tools or devices at
hand to bring about the reversal. All it relies on is recollection. As long as
recollection is seen to be a mere storage of memory material, it appears to
be unﬁt to destabilize the division between “weakness” and “strength.” In-
stead, the psychological needs an act that, while recalling and repeating the
past as it was, reenacts it, gives it space and time, and thus repeats it as
something diﬀerent. As Derrida would say, the psychological requires an
archive.14
In fact, during the last third of the eighteenth century the understanding
of memory rapidly changes, making memory the precursor of the uncon-
scious. Whereas the ﬁrst Encyclopedia Britannica from 1771 still describes
memory as the “store-house of our ideas” whose sole task is to recall past
perceptions in the absence of the sensual object, the new and mostly con-
tinental thought of the time expands the role of memory dramatically.15
From a mere ability to recite, memory becomes a sleeping giant that can
be awakened and take over a person, trigger thoughts and actions uncon-
trolled by the conscious mind.16 (In fact, the very distinction between
thought and action crumbles simultaneously, which leads, for example, to
new legal codiﬁcations of the bad intention.) States of dreaming, of tem-
porary dislocation of the self, and of hypnosis are evidence of the power of
memory and the unconscious. Mesmer becomes a European phenomenon
with his exploitation of the uncontrolled states of the mind.
However, more far-reaching than the hypnotists a` la Mesmer are those
conceptualizations around 1800 that deal with the apparatus of self-
observation. To observe one’s pastmeans ﬁrst of all to frame the pastwithin
an observatory, within some stable structure from which the past can be
monitored, repeated, tested.17 What the new empirical psychology adds to
Locke’s accounts of selfhood and repetition is the peculiar insight into the
productiveness of self-observation. The stable frame, observatory, or lab-
oratory does not precede observation but rather comes about in the very
act of repeating, recalling. By observing one’s past, one supposes or claims
that there is a stable frame that permits observation, some supertemporal
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18. This vocabulary was used by Kant to describe historical observation; one can only observe
and thus repeat from a position outside of time, a stable frame, within which the past could be
viewed in its changeability. “All determination of time presupposes something permanent
[Beharrliche] in perception.”While Kant insists that this “permanent cannot, however, be
something in me,” the early psychologistswill institutionalize the self as something permanent
(Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. NormanKemp Smith [New York, 1965], p. 245).
19. See Karl PhilippMoritz, “Vorschlag,”DeutschesMuseum 1 (1782): 492–95. See alsoMoritz,
“Das menschliche Elend,”Werke, ed. Horst Gu¨nther, 3 vols. (Frankfurt, 1981), 3: 210–14.
stability. This supposed (or simulated) supertemporal stability is “the
self.”18
When Moritz announced in 1782 what would become the foundational
journal of empirical psychology,Das Journal zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde,he
attested to the duality of self-observation as both scientiﬁc observationand
as the production of a stability that was previously unknown to the self. He
argues that self-observation is distinct from other forms of observation be-
cause the observation of one’s self and grief establishes a “refuge” from
which the observation takes place.19 By being observed and thus repeated,
grief ceases to be grief because the repetition itself provided a stable refuge.
It is here that “strength” enters into the picture: the strength of the lab-
oratory, the observation, and therefore the strength of the observer, the self,
that (strongly) guards the identity of its (weak) past. In other words, the act
of repetition implies both the weakness of the original event and the
strength, stability, or frame from which it can be observed, repeated, and
recalled. This is the key achievement of empirical psychology: to establish
an institution of the self that can monitor the past, repeat it, and thereby
turn the past wounding and weakening into a strength, insofar as these
wounds oﬀer the opportunity (or necessity) to repeat and thus to set up a
stable frame for the very repetition.
To recollect and to repeat is to frame what is repeated in the blinders of
observation. To repeat entails three things: ﬁrst, to repeat an old act, which
thereby, secondly, creates a stable frame that allows for repetition in order
for, thirdly, the old act to be reversed on the basis of the newly created sta-
bility. Whatever the old act was, as a repeated act it is a stabilizing act.
2. Pedagogy before the Self
In the beginning, there was pedagogy. At least this is how the middle-
class man wishes his story to be told because aristocracy is determined by
birth alone. It is, therefore, not surprising that (mostly middle-class)
eighteenth-century thinkers stress the impact of education, upbringing,
inﬂuences, and aﬀect upon one’s abilities and identity-formation. These
inﬂuences take the form of friends, milieu, reading materials, images, ex-
amples, behavioral models, tales of wet nurses, and the like. The new ped-
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20. Enlightenment thinkers from Locke to Lessing stress the need for the individual—especially
the father—to be a sovereign. SeeWilfriedWilms, “ImGriﬀ des Politischen: Konﬂiktfa¨higkeit und
Vaterwerdung in Emilia Galotti,”Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fu¨r Literaturwissenschaft und
Geistesgeschichte 76 (Mar. 2002): 50–73.
agogy reinvents the child as its subject. The premise of the “pedagogical
century” is that it views the young individual largely as a tabula rasa, an
unshaped entity that not only can be ediﬁed but needs learning to be any-
thing at all. (This new entity of the child has more than a few similarities
with the utopian island; it marks a beginning, open for Enlightenment
speculation.) The precondition of the assumed perfectibility of man is that
he is “aﬀectable” by the environment. One could say that aﬀectability is the
essence of the new pedagogical man.
However—and here one comes to the structural demands of these bour-
geois ideas—the aﬀectability of man is also the precise limit of this peda-
gogical vision. Because man is thought to be essentially aﬀectable, the one
thing pedagogy fails to explain is howman could learn to be nonaﬀectable,
that is, strong, independent, and solid, having a clear identity and having,
to use the eighteenth-century term, character. But this was the project of
pedagogy in the eighteenth century: to raise strong and independent in-
dividuals who could also go against the grain of their time and withstand
its inﬂuences, so that everyhousehold leader canbe compared toasovereign
or noble statesman.20 But how can a discipline of inﬂuence bring about an
end to inﬂuence?
Pedagogy oﬀered a model of identity derived from the intensive discus-
sions surrounding childhood that followed the publication of Rousseau’s
E´mile, ou de l’education and led to the modern, child-centered pedagogies
of Johann Bernhard Basedow,Dietrich Tiedemann, ChristianGotthilfSalz-
mann, Joachim Heinrich Campe, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, and so on.
One of the most widely read and inﬂuential pedagogues of the age, Campe,
writes:
When you, goodmothers, imagine the young soul of a newborn child as
an extremely soft mound of wax, which still preserves even the gentlest
touch, then, you are . . . on your way to gaining a ﬁne image of the soul.
. . . The soul diﬀers from all things in that the impressions it receives can
by no force be neutralized or destroyed, and can only be modiﬁed by
later impressions. This is diﬀerent for an actual mound of wax that,
with little eﬀort, can always be changed and destroyed so that no trace
remains of the impression. . . . Imagine that there were certain colors of
an inﬁnite variety which could not, once they were painted, be re-
moved, scratched away or painted over in such a way that they could
not still shine through. Imagine now further that all sensual objects in
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21. JoachimHeinrich Campe, U¨ber die fru¨heste Bildung junger Kinderseelen, ed. BrigitteH. E.
Nestroj (1787; Frankfurt, 1985), pp. 81–82.
22. Johann Bernhard Basedow, for example, explains how an early and strict education forced
upon pupils plants seeds of unwillingness so that the beneﬁts of education are overwhelmed by the
negative eﬀects of these planted seeds. “Wenn ein Kind bey dem, was zur Religion geho¨rt, lesen,
schreiben undmemorieren lernt, und oft fu¨r Nachla¨ssigkeit oder Zerstreuung gezu¨chtigt wird; so
the world (that is, everything that can be seen, heard, smelled, tasted,
and felt) were equipped with a brush dipped into such colors such that
they would without interruption paint all things which come into their
proximity. Imagine now that a white board were placed among these
objects with brushes. And, watch, what would happen? You would ﬁnd
that the surface of the board would change its appearance in every mo-
ment, while, however, no stroke of the brush . . . would ever be lost
completely. . . . Every sensual object close enough to your child to im-
press the sensual apparatus awakens an image, a representation in the
soul. This image is only ﬂeeting and will be suppressed [verdra¨ngt]
within the dark consciousness of the child by other images and repre-
sentations. However, do not think that it [the image] will be wasted for
the little soul or will remain without consequences.21
According to Campe and other pedagogues, the essence of identity is its
aﬀectability. It is mutable over time and thus is not to be considered a static
monument. This can be formulated as follows: First, identity is acquired; it
is not given a priori. Second, this acquisition takes place bymeansof contact
with the outsideworld. Third, the key force in identitymaking isperception,
a process that according to Campe seems to be more passive than active (it
is the objects that paint the soul). Fourth, because perception is the force
driving identity-formation, identity is subject to permanent change. Even
the ﬁgure that Campe sets as the goal of education and development
changes its surface and color constantly and is in danger of being destroyed
by a single (sensual) blow. Fifth, identity is radically unique; no two indi-
viduals are alike. Finally, identity is cumulative, nothing gets lost. In short,
the individual starts out as a more or less empty entity without yet having
an identity. It acquires an identity only through constant exposure to ex-
ternal impressions. Each and every impression from the outside has the
potential to destroy the ﬁgure. However, without these sensual impressions
therewould be no identity as such, but rather anuninscribed surface, amere
heap of unshaped wax.
One should note brieﬂy that these speciﬁcations have far-reaching con-
sequences for modern pedagogy, many of which were already drawn by
Campe, Basedow, and Pestalozzi. To mention just two: First, it is best to
leave a child with as little outside guidance and force as possible because
every impulse, whether with positive or negative intentions, will impress
itself on the child mainly as “force” or “violence.”22 Second, Pestalozzi as-
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hat man den Samen eines ku¨nftigenWiderwillens gegen solcheWorte und Sa¨tze in den
Gemu¨thern ausgestreuet. Dieser Saame wa¨chst auf ” (Johann Bernhard Basedow,Methodischer
Unterricht der Jugend in der Religion und Sittenlehre der Vernunft nach dem in der Philalethie
angegebenen Plane [Altona, 1764], p. viii).
23. See JohannHeinrich Pestalozzi, “Tagebuch Pestalozzis u¨ber die Erziehung seines Sohnes”
(1774),Werke, ed. Gertrude Cepl-Kaufmann andManfredWindfuhr, 2 vols. (Munich, 1977),
2:7–18.
24. See Dietrich Tiedemann,Beobachtungen u¨ber die Entwickelung der Seelenfa¨higkeiten bei
Kindern (1787; Altenburg, 1897).
sumes some equilibrium of forces where every outside force on the soulwill
ultimately need to ﬁnd some inside relief. That is, every dent the wax re-
ceives from the outside will result in a bump somewhere else.23 However,
we will be more concerned in the following with the implications of these
speciﬁcations than with the consequences.
Even though these pedagogues stress the desirability of stable human
identities, they cannot account for their genesis. It is the failure of pedagogy
to oﬀer a model for explaining the reversal from the aﬀectable to the strong
man that called for a new intellectual site, a new discourse, a new thought
machine. And it is within this very gap between the perfectible, aﬀectable
man and the strong, unaﬀectable man that the psychological will nest to
provide the operation that closes the gap.
3. Moritz and the Reversal of Recollection
At ﬁrst, it seems that Moritz—hailed nowadays not only as the philo-
sophical inventor of the autonomyof art but also of empiricalpsychology—
follows in Campe’s footsteps because he stresses the long-term eﬀects of
early impressions on later development and identity. In particular, Moritz
emphasizes how one’s cognitive understanding of self and world can be
traced back to certain impressions and associations from one’s past and—
like Tiedemann24—concludes that these impressions are the individual’s
only resource for organizing his or her worldview.
However, Moritz shifts the perspective from the moment of the impres-
sion itself to a later time when the impression is remembered. Moritz
thereby adds another force to this model of identity-formation by means
of impressions—retrospection. Whereas Campe and Pestalozzi, by em-
ploying the imagery of the painter or sculptor, implicitly emphasize the
strongest impression as the most decisive factor in identity-formation,
Moritz uses a more complex criterion to determine which impressions
matter most—those that are later remembered. Two questions need to be
raised: (1) What kind of impressions are later remembered? (2) What does
the later recollection do with these impressions, which turn out to be so
decisive for one’s identity?
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25. See Anthony Krupp, “Other Relations: The Pre-History of le moi and das Ich in Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Karl PhilippMoritz, and JohannGottlieb Fichte,”Goethe Yearbook 11 (2002): 111–31;
Elliott Schreiber “PressingMatters: Karl PhilippMoritz’sModels of the Self in theMagazin zur
Erfahrungsseelenkunde,”Goethe Yearbook 11 (2002): 133–58; Andreas Gailus, “A Case of
Individuality: Karl PhilippMoritz and theMagazine for Empirical Psychology,”NewGerman
Critique 79 (Winter 2000): 67–105; and ErichMeuthen, Selbstu¨berredung: Rhetorik und Roman im
18. Jahrhundert (Freiburg, 1994), pp. 234–40.
26. The single childhood recollection thatMoritz repeatedly reports—under the guise of his
pseudonymAnton Reiser—that does not hinge on a correctable, revisable false idea is a memory
of being under the cover of his mother’s coat so that the harsh weather did not aﬀect him. In all
accounts of Moritz’s early memories, this event appears as the ﬁrst one. It becomes the model for
the act of recollecting because it indicates where recollection should end, namely, in a state of
being unaﬀectable, covered up by his mother. It is the ﬁrst memory that is not to be corrected and
thus does not allow the transformation fromweak to strong.
27.Moritz, “Erinnerungen aus den fru¨hesten Jahren der Kindheit,”Gnothi Sauton:Magazin
zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde 1, no. 1 (1783): 67; hereafter abbreviated “E.” See alsoMoritz,Werke,
3:104–7.
Moritz oﬀers an account of what makes recollections so signiﬁcant in
his own childhood memories, which he repeatedly recounts in factual and
ﬁctional discourse. These diﬀerent recollections have been subjected to a
signiﬁcant amount of recent debate concerning their precise meaning and
signiﬁcance.25 My argument in regard to these recollections is simply that
most and, in fact, all but one (a meaningful exception)26 of these recollec-
tions include some “false idea,” somemisguided association, some percep-
tion or some interpretation of a situation that is wrong—at least in the eyes
of the one who later remembers and evaluates these impressions, events,
and situations. Recollection is possible because there is something left to be
done for a critical memory, something to reconsider and reevaluate. These
false ideas are usually sensual ideas, or perceptions, but also include ideas
of cause and eﬀect or moral ideas.
In “Erinnerungen aus den fru¨hesten Jahren der Kindheit” (Memories
from the Earliest Years ofMyChildhood) (1783),Moritz recalls a hugecloset
from his childhood precisely because, as a child, he thought it must be in-
habited by people: “I also remember a black closet on the ﬂoor of a neigh-
bor’s house in the town of my birth, and this closet seemed so uncannily
large to me that I believed that there had to be people living inside.”27 In
several othermemories,Moritz emphasizes, andactually italicizes, thecolor
given in the memory, a color that is linked to a false idea. He remembers
the dress of his family’s “mean, hard” landlady to be “gray” (“E,” p. 67).
That is, the ﬁrst association with gray is that of meanness or hardness. Yet,
as strongly as this ﬁrst impression of the color gray probably was felt, the
color association ought to prove itself to bemisleading over time.Not every
woman wearing gray will show similar character features.
The early impression needs to be adjusted. In the same text, he remem-
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28.Moritz,Anton Reiser: A Psychological Novel, trans. P. E. Matheson (Oxford, 1926), p. 29.
bers how the landscape seemed to be “ﬂying by” while he was sitting on a
moving chariot (“E,” p. 69). In all of these cases, some perception or inter-
pretation of a situation gives birth to an idea that is later proven tobewrong.
It seems that it is precisely the false idea that keeps the past available for
later thought. A more complex account of such a false idea is presented in
the following scene from Moritz’s childhood:
I ran across the street from our house . . . and back again. A well-dressed
man walked in the middle of the road and I ran straight into him. Now I
clearly recall how I started to hit the man with both ﬁsts because I
thought he had doneme an injustice, whereas, in fact, I was the wrong-
doer [da ich doch im Grunde der beleidigende Teil war]. [“E,” p. 68]
In this recollection, the false idea is moralistic, an incorrect perception of
who is right and wrong. Here the correction of the past does not aﬀect a
wrong perception as in the earlier hallucinations but a perception of some-
thing that is wrong and should be changed. Thus, it is again the false idea
that makes the event memorable because Moritz later feels compelled to
admit that it was he who was wrong, not the stranger. The recollection of
the event is thus a correction, a correction in whichMoritz himself was the
oﬀender and not the oﬀended as he had thought. This correction shifts the
agency to Moritz in at least three ways: He was the perpetrator of injustice
and not the victim; he is the one who needs to retell the story in order to
correct his original, mistaken perception; and, as the agent, he is the one
who still needs to apologize.
Moritz publishes this account again in 1785 in the ﬁrst part of the more
or less autobiographical novel Anton Reiser. He makes a remarkable ad-
dendum to the scene by writing that he had already had the feeling that he
was doing something wrong at the time of the event and that he pushed the
man “violently, because he wished to persuade himself and others that he
had been wronged, although he had an inward feeling that he himself was
the oﬀender.”28 Here, the order of perception and correction is reversed.
Whereas the ﬁrst account of the memory simply shows a false perception
of the situation that requires a later correction, the second memory shows
a correction that aims to alter the simultaneous perception of the event.He
does notwant his beingwrong,whichhe knows to be true, tobeperceivable.
This is remarkable in two respects. First, correction is not a secondary phe-
nomenon to the perception of reality, but rather a forming principle of per-
ception. Reiser pushes the man “because” he does not want to admit what
happened. Second, this refusal to admit indicates that the false idea that
This content downloaded from 129.79.32.213 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 15:54:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Critical Inquiry / Autumn 2005 89
29. There are many indications in these texts that the notion of idea is to be taken as a sensual,
or conceptual, representation of how things are, as a medium of presentation, rather than as a
neo-Platonic, detached, and abstract idea. For a fuller reading of this quote, see Anthony Krupp,
“Other Relations.”
allows, and calls for, a later revision is not simply a mistake. Rather, a false
idea or memory is the product of an active and violent repression of the
truth. The event lasts as a memory as long as the revision and correction is
kept at bay violently, if necessary, by means of ﬁsts. Only when the later
recollection reverses the primal/original event does it come to an end.
To summarize: The retrospectionsMoritz reports require or invite a cor-
rection, revision, alteration, or perhaps taming of what the child seemed to
experience, despite what actually happened. This emphasis on the perspec-
tive of retrospection is the key distinction between the pedagogical and the
new psychological discourses. Pedagogy examines events as they take place;
psychology deals with those past events that retrospectively matter (even if
they did not while they occurred). Moritz’s point is not only that one re-
members those moments that allow or call for a later alteration but that
early impressions matter insofar as they call for a second force to revise
them. In revising the past impressions, they are aﬃrmed as the proper space
of the self (because it matters that they need to be revised) precisely because
they are not (yet) proper. It is no coincidence that Moritz emphasizes the
role of phenomena and language (homophones, alliterations, and so on) in
these false ideas, as they allow the distinction to be made between themere
deceptive will-o’-the-wisp and the appearance of a truth, thus opening a
space in which corrective revisions can take place.
One could say with Niklas Luhmann that false ideas are the medium of
the psychological. As amedium, the false ideas bring together, andalsohold
apart, two distinct entities, namely, the recollectedpast and thepresent con-
sciousness, as the present consciousness observes its past by means of the
false ideas. And as a medium of diﬀerence the false idea allows for the pro-
duction of a present consciousness that diﬀers from the past. In this sense,
Moritz speaks of childhood ideas as the “ribbon” between the two: “Could
it be that the ideas from childhood are the thin and imperceptible ribbon
that connects our present state with the past state, when that which con-
stitutes our self now at one time was present under diﬀerent circum-
stances?” (“E,” p. 66).29 Without false ideas, the present self would be
incapable of knowing its past, and it would not be able to diﬀerentiate itself
vis-a`-vis its past.
Moritz’s own life—or is it Anton Reiser’s?—is the testing ground for this
“revisionist” recollection model, and it would be tempting at this point to
engage in a reading of Anton Reiser in this vein. However, I will focus on
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30.Moritz,Anton Reiser, pp. 246–47; trans. mod.
just one moment in the life of Anton Reiser, which shows the potential of
Moritz’s insights. This moment is depicted as a turning point in the novel’s
third book, in which Reiser ﬁnds a solution to his permanent crisis. This is
also the part of the novelwhereMoritz ﬁrst employs “the self ” (“dasSelbst”)
as a term to describe Reiser’s state. The occasion of this epoch in young
Reiser’s life is a public school examination inwhich he is never asked aques-
tion because his clothing marks him as poorer than his peers. He leaves the
scene while the examinations continue, goes for a walk, and has the follow-
ing insight:
Where was he to ﬁnd ﬁrm rooting in the great empty world, where he
saw himself pushed out [herausgedra¨ngt] from all human relations? . . .
The thought came to him that from childhood on his fate had been to
be suppressed [verdra¨ngt zu werden]. If he wanted to look on at any-
thing, when it was a case of pressing oneself forward [sich hinzuzudra¨n-
gen], everyone else was quicker and pressed themselves [dra¨ngte sich
vor] in front of him. . . . And he retired, and now was looking at the
throng [Gedra¨nge] from a distance, as he stood there, lonely. . . . The
thought that he could look at the throng so quietly withoutmingling in
it, made up somewhat for the loss of what he missed seeing: alone, he
felt himself nobler andmore distinguished than as someone lost in the
crowd. His pride, which came to the fore, overcame the vexation that he
felt at ﬁrst. That he could not join the crowd pressed him back into
himself [daß er an den Haufen sich nicht anschließen konnte, dra¨ngte ihn
in sich selbst zuru¨ck]; and ennobled and exalted his thoughts and feel-
ings. . . . This solitary walk developed in him, in a moment, more feel-
ings and contributedmore to his spiritual education than all the lessons
he had ever had in school. . . . It was this solitary walk, which raised Rei-
ser’s self-esteem [Selbstgefu¨hl],widened his horizon, and gave him a
clear idea of his own isolated existence.30
This is a seminal psychological moment, at least as regards the psychol-
ogy that Moritz develops. In articulating his sudden understanding that he
has been suppressed (see his constant use of inﬂections of the German
drang/dra¨ngen), Reiser adopts the activity of repression upon himself and
begins to actively suppress himself: “that he could not join the crowd
pressed him back into himself.” What happens here is that Reiser appro-
priates the impression of repression (to be pushed aside, pressed out of the
way, and so on) in order to correct this very impression (namely, by “press-
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ing” himself into himself). He reenacts his own repression, only this time
he is the agent and the object. Instead of simply being (sup- or im-) pressed,
he presses himself into himself. The duplicationof the act opensupaduality
of subject and object, of the prior victim of a repression and its agent, of
that which is (sup)pressed and that which (sup)presses, and thus of the
weakness of the past and the strength of the present.
It is important to emphasize that this therapeutic act is not simply an
undoing of the past but rather a preservation and repetition of the wound.
At the same time the later repression is notmerely a repetitionofpastevents,
but also a grammatical turn from the passivity of being suppressed to the
activity of actively suppressing, a reduplication that he controls. He makes
the original act his own; he makes it himself. The weapon that inﬂicted the
wound becomes an integral part of the healing process. Thepast impression
is literally the material of its own amelioration. The self becomes the frame
within which the repetition and reversal of the past takes place.
As long as Reiser was simply suppressed by other people, he was merely
the ﬂuctuating, impulsive receiver of acts over which he had no command.
But once he controls the repression andduplicates it by suppressinghimself,
the scene of suppressing and being suppressed becomes the operative site
where he “takes place,” where his being is invoked, and where he is “en-
nobled.” The past wounding becomes an operational space where the in-
ﬂiction is staged and restaged. This restaging implies the stabilityofa theatre
of the self within which the wounding is presented. Around the suppressed
being is the stable frame of someone who monitors and repeats the past of
repression.
What Moritz demonstrates is that the past can be repeated, not in the
sense of an identical reiteration of a recordedmessage, but, rather, as a stage
script that one can employ to act out. As a script, the past can be followed
to the letter, repeated in that sense. And, at the same time, everything is
diﬀerent about this repeated past because it is directed, staged, managea-
ble—an orchestrated disaster. It takes place as repetition on some stage
within a frame, a stable architecture, within the walls of some laboratory,
operating room, or test chamber.Onlywithin a set observatory can twoacts
appear to be identical. Thus, the repetition of the past that Moritz enacts
here and elsewhere both requires and posits the stability of a perspective
from which two acts or two situations can be—or appear to be—identical.
For this new being, everything can be repeated, restaged, reenacted. Re-
peatability is the essence of the self.
Before this epoch in Anton Reiser’s journey through life, no such stable
entity existed. His identity was in ﬂux. However, in the moment of the
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31. Laurie Ruth Johnson reports howMoritz transformswounds and pain into a solid aesthetic
form.WhereasMoritz believes pain to resist representation, it is nevertheless the foundation of
aesthetic stability as Moritz shows in his retelling of the Philomena story; see Laurie Ruth Johnson,
The Art of Recollection in Jena Romanticism:Memory, History, Fiction, and Fragmentation in Texts
by Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis (Tu¨bingen, 2002), pp. 78–85.
32. It makes sense here to consider thatMoritz is not only one of the fathers of empirical
psychology but also the inventor of the “autonomy of art.” Since his 1785 texts, Moritz
conceptualized art according to an institutionalmodel, making it complete in itself. It has already
been shown howMoritz’s theory of autonomous art carried over into other areas of his thought,
such as politics. See JonathanM. Hess,Reconstituting the Body Politic: Enlightenment, Public
Culture, and the Invention of Aesthetic Autonomy (Detroit, 1999).
33. It is crucial for man “that his own thinking self does not present any contact with
misfortune, so that misfortune can only play with the self ’s environment but not aﬀect the self in
itself; so that the self is able—in every moment of its existence—towithdraw into itself and freely
give over everything surrounding it to contingency— . . . fromwithin this secure fortiﬁcation that
I have drawn aroundmyself, I view contingencywith contempt” (Moritz, “Denkwu¨rdigkeiten,
aufgezeichnet zur Befo¨rderung des Edlen und Scho¨nen,”Werke, 3: 214).
34. Of course, readers of Moritz’s aesthetics will be quick to add that this autonomy does not
exist and is only rhetorically simulated. See Ru¨diger Campe, “Zeugen und Fortzeugen in Karl
PhilippMoritz’ U¨ber die bildende Nachahmung des Scho¨nen,” inKunst—Zeugung—Geburt:
Theorien undMetaphern a¨sthetischer Produktion in der Neuzeit, ed. Christian Begemann and
David E.Wellbery (Freiburg, 2002), pp. 225–50.
35. In this sense, Derrida can speak of the archive as both a place of the beginnings, of the past,
the foundation, and as the place of command, control, and power. See Derrida,Archive Fever.
Using this notion, we could say thatMoritz discovers the self as archive.Moreover,Moritz is the
quoted scene of reversal, the stability of a ﬁxed perspective comes about:
the stability of Reiser’s recognition of being the one who has been sup-
pressed. And, with this moment, Moritz has a self, an identity.31
Precisely because of this dualitywithin himself and the splitbetweensub-
ject and object, Reiser can be the addressee of his own acts, be his own goal
and complete in himself (as Moritz would say, in sich selbst vollendet) be-
cause his operations have himself as an object. The resulting eﬀect is the
solidiﬁcation of the self, the institutionalization of the self as an entity that
perpetuates itself through its acts because its acts are aimed at itself as the
telos.32 In this sense we could say that the new self is above all an institution
that serves no other purpose than guarding its self-identity. Thus, the re-
duplication and the correction of past impressions is the force that makes
the aﬀectable individual unaﬀectable and makes him or her a “fortress,” as
Moritz writes elsewhere.33 Indeed, Moritz—who is usually hailed as the in-
ventor of the autonomy of the artwork—could also claim to be the coin-
ventor, along with Rousseau, of the autonomous self that is complete in
itself like a work of art.34
This is the remarkable foundational act of psychology: that which
wounds the individual can—but there is no guarantee—turn out to be his
greatest strength, can be his shell of protection once it enters the apparatus
of recollection.35 For Moritz, the past that shapes an individual is the very
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thinker of archival production, the one who discovers how recollection establishes the stable
structure of an institution that reverses the weakness of the individual into a source of strength.
36. Although I will not go down this road now, it seems fair to mention that the other andmost
discredited founder of psychology, Franz AntonMesmer, sharesMoritz’s willingness to abandon
full knowledge of the self in order instead to focus on the reversal. In a witty account of the birth of
empirical psychology, Peter Sloterdijk characterizes the task of psychology as a cure from the self;
see Peter Sloterdijk,Der Zauberbaum:Die Entstehung der Psychoanalyse im Jahr 1785 (Frankfurt,
1985).
37. For a more complex account, see EdgarMarsch,Die Kriminalerza¨hlung: Theorie-Geschichte-
Analyse (Munich, 1972).
obstacle to be overcome, thematerial for a renewal, and thatwhichprovides
for the very operation of the renewal of the individual.36
Thus, the starting point of pedagogy and psychology alike is that thepast
shapes the identity of an individual.However,what psychology adds toped-
agogy is that the past shaping of the individual can be reversed by certain
acts of recollection.Weakening acts can be turned into a source of strength.
In short, the pedagogical subject can be improved, bettered, or spoiled,
whereas the psychological self comes about by being changed, inverted, or
dissociated from itself. The self as such is the product of the operation of
the psychological, the correction of memory, the archival act. It is in this
sense that psychology is not a science of understanding but a technique.
4. Hoffmann and the Self as Prison
Moritz’s discovery of the force of recollection starts the age of the Bil-
dungsroman. Moritz’s friend Goethe oﬀers the paradigmatic example,
Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, just a few years later. Still, Moritz’s careful op-
timism about the force of recollection is not universally shared. ForMoritz,
the reversal and consequent institutionalization of the self allows the in-
dividual to stand its ground against its environment and be strong. The
new self is better, that is, better protected from the outside throng.However,
its demise is at hand. The new operations thatMoritz discovers, namely the
grammatical turn of the self, can also, with only a few alterations, lead to
the individual’s imprisonment behind the bars of the self.
The self as a prison: This, at least, is the lesson of Hoﬀmann’s signature
novella Fra¨ulein von Scuderi (1818), a story usually hailed as the world’s ﬁrst
detective storywith aMissMarple–typedetective.37 In thisnovella, a famous
goldsmith confesses that he killed his clients to regain the precious stones
they had given him for improvements. He claims that his drive to kill and
to steal stones ﬁnds its origin in a primary event experienced by hismother
while she was pregnant with him:
Wise men often speak of the strange impressions which aﬄict pregnant
women, and of the strange inﬂuence these impressions from the outside
This content downloaded from 129.79.32.213 on Tue, 13 Jun 2017 15:54:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
94 Fritz Breithaupt / Trauma in German Romanticism
38. E. T. A. Hoﬀmann, “Mademoiselle de Scudery,” trans. Sally Hayward,Tales of Hoﬀmann, ed.
R. J. Hollingdale (London, 1982), pp. 64–65.
can have on a child. I have been told a strange story about mymother.
In the ﬁrst month in which she was pregnant withme, she was watching
a brilliant court festival in the Trianon. There, her glance fell on a cava-
lier in Spanish dress, with a glittering bejeweled chain about his neck
fromwhich she could scarcely tear her eyes away. Her whole being
lusted after the sparkling stones. . . . The cavalier noticedmymother’s
longing, ﬁery glances. . . . He found a way of approaching her, of entic-
ing her away to a lonely place. There he clasped her passionately in his
arms; mymother grasped the beautiful chain, but at the same instant he
fell and draggedmymother with him to the ground.Whether it was
sudden heart attack or some other cause—suﬃce is to say that he was
dead. Mymother’s eﬀorts to free herself from the stiﬀened arms of the
corpse were vain. His hollow eyes, their sight extinguished, ﬁxed upon
her, the deadman rolled to the ground with her. . . . The horror of this
threwmymother on to a sick-bed. . . . She recovered. . . . But the fear of
the terrible moment had gone intome. My evil star had risen and had
sent down ﬁres which kindled in me one of the strangest andmost per-
nicious of passions. Even when I was very young, sparkling diamonds,
golden jewelry, meant more tome than anything else. . . . It was only so
as to be able to handle gold and precious stones that I turned to the
goldsmith’s trade. . . . As soon as I had completed a piece of work and
delivered it, I became agitated, I fell into a state of desperationwhich
robbedme of my sleep, my health—my vital energies. The person for
whom I was working stood before my eyes day and night like a ghost,
adorned withmy jewelry, and a voice whispered in my ear: It is yours
really, it is yours really; take it, then—what do diamondsmean to a dead
man?38
What this text spells out are the eﬀects of having a primal scene for one’s
life. The primal scenemaps out the territory within which the self will exist.
All later life aﬃrms the earlier scene in the form of repetitions anddisplace-
ments. However, precisely because there is such a primal scene—namely,
themother’s arrest in the stiﬀenedarmsof the cavalier—the laterrepetitions
diﬀer from it in at least one respect. The mere temporality of the primal
scene, of themother ﬁrst longing for the stones and, then, the suddendeath
of the cavalier, is reduplicated, repeated, and reversed as a causality. The
owner of the stones is already dead because there is the longing, because
there is a stone. Whereas the primal scene contained no causal and only an
accidental, or temporal-situational, connection between themother grasp-
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39. BurkhardDohm suggests the shaping of Cardillac’s identity be considered in terms of the
prenatal unity of mother and child, a motif that Lessing had already used in Laokoon. Indeed, as
Dohm shows, several key theories of the era stressed such a prenatal unity, as found inMesmer’s
hypnotism and Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert’s psychology. Unfortunately,Dohm does not use these
sources to make a critical comparison of early psychologywith Hoﬀmann’s ideas. Instead, Dohm
seems to ﬁll the (fascinating) voids of the novella with contemporary science; see Burkhard
Dohm, “Das unwahrscheinlicheWahrscheinliche: Zur PlausibilisierungdesWunderbaren in
E. T. A. HoﬀmannsDas Fra¨ulein von Scuderi,”Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fu¨r Literaturwissenschaft
und Geistesgeschichte 73 (June 1999): 289–318.
40. In AchimWu¨rker’s reading of the novella, he goes so far as to argue that the storymanifests
a longing for the prenatal state of being in the mother’s womb.Wu¨rker also suggests that the
jewels in their cases serve as a representation (wemay say allegory) of this longing.Wu¨rker’s
unorthodox approach of noticing the story’s eﬀects on him, the reader, is certainly philologically
suspect. And, indeed, some of his ideas lack the proper grounding of textual evidence (for
example,Wu¨rker suggests that the prenatal Cardillac witnesses the sexual act of his parents and
reacts with delayed aggression).However, it should be noted that there are quite a few readings of
the story that succeed in integrating as many of the text’s bizzare details asWu¨rker’s. See Achim
Wu¨rker, “Der Umgangmit demGeheimnis: Unbewußte Lebensentwu¨rfe in E. T. A. Hoﬀmann’s
‘Das Fra¨ulein von Scuderi,’” Jahrbuch fu¨r internationaleGermanistik 27, no. 2 (1995): 107–41.
ing the precious jewels and the death of their owner, the repetitions by the
son imply a causal connection between the stones and the death of the
owner. The primal scene has become a script, mold, or law for all later repe-
titions. Cardillac hears the whispering voice in his ear saying that the bearer
of stones is already dead, while he is still alive: “What do diamonds mean
to a dead man?” Apparently, the voice anticipates the repetition of the pri-
mal scene, that is, views it as a given fact to the degree that the one who has
the stones automatically will be, is, has been, and has to be the dead man.
The command of the inner voice is so strong that the one who listens to it
has to transform the scene in order to make it ﬁt the scene that the voice
from the past indicates, which means the owner must be killed. Put simply,
the repetition of a primal scene excludes time and replaces it by mere ne-
cessity. The temporal lineage of the primal scene initiates and becomes a
causal order.39
Thus, the mother, in the state of ﬁxation, enveloped by the corpse, be-
comes the model for the self in general. It is the stability of the envelop-
ment—of the incarceration—that provides the individual’s identity.40 An
identity, a self, comes about once there is a state of ﬁxation that provides a
space within which repetition is possible. The ﬁrst experience of such a ﬁx-
ation serves as the model of the self, be it the horriﬁc scene for Cardillac’s
mother or the merely unpleasant experience of Hoﬀmann’s own pregnant
mother, traveling and thus locked up in noisy horse carriages, an experience
that Hoﬀmann blames for his later restlessness. In other words, repetition
compulsion (Wiederholungszwang) is not an arbitrary law imposed upon
individuals by some prehuman history as Freud contemplated but rather is
a structural necessity for having a self.
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41. Ju¨rgen Fohrmann has argued that the new idea of the curriculumvitae around 1800 reﬂects
an awareness of the narrative command one has over one’s past. Any singlemoment can be chosen
as a point of culmination and climax for relating one’s life. See Ju¨rgen Fohrmann, “Einleitung,” in
Lebensla¨ufe um 1800, ed. Fohrmann (Stuttgart, 1999), pp. 1–15.
42. Themiddle-classman’s project to elevate himself from the state of weakness by means of the
psychological enthrones a newmaster and builds a new prison for the middle-classman. If we
There are obvious diﬀerences in the structure and vocabulary inMoritz’s
and Hoﬀmann’s accounts of the formation of the self by means of repeti-
tion. For one, Moritz relies on an active process of cognition in his correc-
tion/reversal ofmemories.Hoﬀmann’s novella, on theotherhand, indicates
that there is no possibility of a corrective impetus for setting up a mecha-
nism of reversal. Once the scene of arrest serves as the primal scene, it
becomes the law of all repetition. This leads to a second fundamental dif-
ference. InMoritz’s accounts, the repetitions serve aparticular goal,namely,
to free the individual from the negativity of the past. InHoﬀmann,however,
there is no implicit teleology in the repetitions. The repetitions occur for
their own sake, and the individual is doomed to follow them. Thirdly, these
diﬀerences expand the idea of what qualiﬁes as a primal scene. In Moritz’s
texts, any false idea that calls for correction will set up a space for repetition
because these moments provide later memory with a function—namely, to
correct. In Hoﬀmann’s texts, however, any scene involving an arrest is po-
tentially the once-and-forever site of the self.41
Nevertheless, the basic similarity betweenMoritz andHoﬀmann should
not be overlooked. First of all, both accounts rely on a mechanism of repe-
tition of the past to consolidate a self. The very space of the self, that is, the
self as such, is mapped out in the territory covered by the repetitions. Self-
hood consists in the stability necessary to perform the operation of repe-
tition (which in both cases involves a particular reversal). Secondly, in both
cases the repetition transforms the passive ﬁrst act into an activity by the
subject; Reiser suppresses himself, and Cardillac kills the owner of the
stones. Thirdly, in both cases the repetition involves a linguistic dimension
that indicates that the self is essentially linguistic. In Moritz’s case, this in-
cludes both the grammatical turn from passive to active, as well as the fre-
quent stressing of linguistic phenomena that need correction, such as with
young Reiser’s mistaken memory of alliteration in the gospels. In Hoﬀ-
mann’s account, the strong impression of the sparkling stones lives on in
the son and is transformed metonymically in several steps from the “spar-
kling stones,” to the shining eyes and the “hollow eyes,” and then, ﬁnally,
to the “evil star” that whispers into the goldsmith’s ear that he should kill
and take control of the stones.
In short, while Moritz andHoﬀmann fundamentally diﬀer in their eval-
uations of repetition as potentially positive or as purely negative, they both
rely on repetition as the place where the self becomes itself.42
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were to follow Friedrich Kittler’s reading of this story, we would have to say that this newmaster,
who takes over the place of the (dead) aristocrat, is a mistress, that is, the mother. See Friedrich
Kittler,Dichter,Mutter, Kind (Munich, 1991).
43. It is useful to consider the historical background of this spectacle for a full reading of the
text; see Maurice Samuels, “Realizing the Past: History and Spectacle in Balzac’sAdieu,”
Representations,no. 79 (Aug. 2002): 82–99.
5. Balzac’s Cure of Trauma: Woman as Laboratory Animal
The technology of reversal is at the center of other early trauma texts as
well. Fifty years before Charcot’s attempts to heal trauma bymeans of hyp-
nosis, in Balzac’s novella Adieu (1830) a whole battle scene from the Na-
poleonic winter war in Russia is restaged in order to reverse a young
woman’s loss of sanity. In the battle, hardly conscious of anything around
her, she departs from a lover who does not yet know that he loves her with
the word “Adieu.” This very word is the last human trace that remains of
her in the years that follow, in which she ﬁrst becomes a plaything for the
soldiers and then an animal-like creature living in an abandoned villa.And,
when her lover-to-be, the oﬃcer, ﬁnds her again, she still does not return
to a human consciousness. However, he now views their separation as the
beginning of a love to come. This is why he resorts to his plan to restage the
complete battle scenewith the help of hundreds of hired peasants.Hewants
to rethread her human life where it ended, to bring it back on track. Indeed,
the rebooting works. For a moment, she seems to come back to conscious-
ness with all memories intact. However, the situation overwhelms her,
again, and she dies in the arms of the oﬃcer. She ismade tobe the laboratory
animal. The experiment succeeds, and she dies.
Here, again, we are dealingwith repetition. This time, the repetitiondoes
not take place within an institutionalized self (that is, a self institutionalized
by means of repetition) but relies on a diﬀerent framing stabilizer: the sit-
uation, the battle scene that frames the repetition.43 Again, the very repe-
tition involves a reversal that rotates on an axis of stability. This axis is the
word adieu, the title of the story. In the primal scene in the winter battle,
adieu was a word of departure. Little hope remained for a later reunion
between the two because the oﬃcer’s situation appearedhopeless.Theword
is all that is left for her during the years of her derangement. Even when the
situation is repeated in every detail, there remains the word of departure,
and thus the situation remains one of departure. And, even when her lover,
the oﬃcer, returns, the very word adieu that she utters overshadows the
repetition. It must again be a scene of departure because the word of de-
parture, adieu, is repeated. And, because he arrives, she leaves. She dies.
Again, the repetition is a full repetition only because it is a reversal of the
primary scene:Where she was saved before, she now dies. At the same time,
this reversal stabilizes the primary scene by making the temporality of de-
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44. Using the novella’s politics of gender division and animality as the starting point, Felman’s
famous reading questions (the equation of) madness, animality, and silence of the woman; see
Shoshana Felman,Writing andMadness: Literature/Philosophy/Psychoanalysis, trans.MarthaNoel
Evans (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985).
parture its law. The oﬃcer will not forget her and later commits suicide in
remembrance of her.
In a departure from Moritz’s psychology, the oﬃcer in the novella tests
a complete undoing of trauma using repetition as the instrument of the
undoing. However, the oﬃcer’s failure is described by a logic close to that
of Moritz. Where there is a stable frame of repetition, a reversal will occur
that also reduplicates the original. An adieu is still an adieu. The repeti-
tion—which is the only chance for a cure, a cure that the woman does not
ask for, as Shoshana Felman emphasizes—canonlyoccurby simultaneously
aﬃrming the stability of the frame, the situation, the adieu, which means
the departure.44 The ﬁrst attempt at undoing trauma, as exempliﬁed in this
story, is thus already a catastrophe. One can instrumentalize trauma only
by traumatizing the instrument.
6. Moritz versus Freud: Trauma and Ideology
When we read about trauma today, one thing seems clear: trauma and
the self cannot be thought together. Trauma is the wound that prevents the
self from being a self. The self cannot integrate trauma into itself. Trauma
is not a mere wound somewhere that can be healed or left alone. Trauma,
rather, consumes the self. The trauma of trauma, it seems, is that it does
not have a beginning or end, no space from here to there, no time of before
and after, and thus cannot allow any discourse that might address trauma.
Trauma is amemory disorder that prevents thewounding frombeingprop-
erly stored as a past event; it hangs on, is everywhere and nowhere. Trauma
limits the self to a traumatic space of repetition without borders and con-
tours. Thus, trauma does not even limit the self to a space because trauma
does not permit space.Where there is trauma there is no space, andnospace
for the self. Trauma is the end of the self. Thus, trauma does not even oﬀer
the end of the self because there is not even time for an end.
However, whatwe have just read about early empirical psychologypoints
in the opposite direction. For thinkers likeMoritz, trauma, that is,voluntary
or involuntary repetition of the past, is the condition of the possibility of
the self. In fact, the repetition itself is the very force that implies the stability
of a self and will posit a self even if such a thing is not yet available. Trauma
and self are ﬂipsides of one and the same coin.
The contrast between early and contemporary forms of trauma studies
is obvious, as it is obvious that much of this contrast is owed to diﬀering
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45. See Sigmund Freud, “Remembering, Repeating, andWorking-Through (Further
Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis)” (1914),The Standard Edition of the
Complete PsychologicalWorks of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London,
1958–74), 12:145–56.
notions of selfhood. For Moritz, the self is an entity to be constructed; for
Freud it is a hidden reality to be discovered and set free.Tomark thecontrast
between eighteenth- and twentieth-century thought on trauma, one can
examine how Freud dissociates two terms that Moritz presents as one: re-
membering [erinnern] and repeating [wiederholen]. In his 1913 text “Re-
membering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” Freud separates the two
to such a degree that each stands for a diﬀerent relationship to the past.45
Freud calls Erinnern the exceptional direct access to the past, whether it is
simply not blocked by anything or opened up by means of hypnosis. On
the other hand, he callsWiederholen the repeating of the past in such a way
that the repeating subject does not know that he or she is repeating some
past event (usually, the repetition occurs partly displaced and involves some
U¨bertragung). The key advancement that leads Freud to this splittingofboth
notions is, of course, his positing of repression (Verdra¨ngung). The trou-
bling past usually cannot be remembered (erinnert) because it is repressed
(verdra¨ngt).Thus, for Freud theworkof healing ismostly aworkofundoing
repression, that is, to actively combat and overcome (u¨berwinden) the re-
sistance of repression. Put simply, the work of therapy is to transform repe-
tition into remembrance. One is oneself once one is able to let go of the
(traumatic) past. Trauma and repression are the forces that hinderone from
being oneself.
For Moritz, therapy goes in the opposite direction. The task is to appro-
priate the (remembered) past bymeans of repeating it. Thework of therapy
is to transformmere remberence into repetition. Repetition, asMoritz sees
it, is thus not only an act of aﬃrming the past but also of reversing the
passivity of the past into activity. This includes, as we have seen, not an
overcoming of repression, but rather an active repeating, evoking, stimu-
lating, instituting, and operating of repression. One is the repressor of one-
self, the repressed. Trauma (that is, repetition) is what enables one to
become oneself.
According to Freud, repression is the subject’s emergency strategy. Ac-
cording to Moritz, repression is the enemy that is to be converted by the
subject into a tool. Labor, be it the labor of appropriating repression as in
Moritz or the labor of battling repression as in Freud, is the common de-
nominator of their respective therapies.
What Moritz adds to Freud is a positive account of the institutionali-
zation involved in traumatic repetition. The space of repetition is the space
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46.More recently, a thirdmodel for the relationship between self and trauma has been
suggested: to understand and accept the traumatized being as a “diminished self ” (Lawrence
Langer,Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory [NewHaven, Conn., 1991], p. 177). This third
model has been proposed by Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard, who understands trauma to be the only,
paradoxical access to certain historic experiences, such as the Holocaust; see Jean-Franc¸ois
Lyotard,Heidegger and “the Jews,” trans. AndreasMichel andMark S. Roberts (Minneapolis,
1990). In a related way,Michael S. Roth emphasizes that the so-called healing of trauma
normalizes and banalizes the past at the cost of its uniqueness. Thus, he highlights attempts to
accept the past as an open wound; seeMichael S. Roth, “Hysterical Remembering,”Modernism/
Modernity 3 (Apr. 1996): 1–30.
of the self ’s insistence and thus existence. Where Freud sees it as his goal to
crack down on the resistance surrounding repression, repetition, and
trauma, Moritz would view this as an attack on the self. Freud, in fact, fre-
quently records that this is how his patients experience his therapy—as an
attack against their essence, against themselves. ForMoritz, even thehorror
of the past can be a home for the self. Repetition of the past is not simply
the vocabulary of trauma and repression [Verdra¨ngung] but of a fortress of
selfhood.
Still, Moritz sees reason to leave trauma and repetition behind. He does
so, however, not in the name of the self. Rather, the self, a self, is the very
thing to be left behind. The goal is not to ﬁnd a new snail shell. Instead, it
is to go into an open land. This is accomplished not through Freudian ther-
apeutic attacks (even if these attacks are in the service of some hermeneu-
tics) but rather by means of the lure of the unknown, of that which is not
knownor knowable. It is poetry and promises of anotherworld thatprompt
Moritz to go elsewhere. Precisely because repetition and trauma mark the
space of the self, it is the unrepeatable, the singular, or unknown that be-
come destinations for the individual. FromMoritz’s perspective Freud for-
gets to oﬀer his patients a reason for leaving the fortress of trauma. For
Moritz, there is still a beyond to psychology, even within a psychological
novel.46
7. Outlook: Trauma Studies Today
Let me close by considering two of the potential abuses of the notion or
technology of trauma. First, like any concept, the concept of trauma is not
a description of a truth but a formative principle that makes truth. As a
changing historical concept, trauma has served various interests and ﬁlled
various functions over the past two centuries, some of which have been
sketched in this essay. The point of oﬀering an historical account is not to
invalidate trauma but rather to indicate inwhichway a speciﬁcunderstand-
ing of trauma shapes the way a case of trauma will be experienced, told,
understood, and used. And, of course, whenever experience is ruled by a
concept, ideology is a possibility. Even empirical psychology can be a blind
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47. One canmake the case that this is exactly what happened after September 11, 2001. The
media, in search for a ﬁtting narrative, resorted to trauma stories. This may have been well
founded in regard to the families of victims but failed to consider the political dimensions of the
events by representing the country as an unconscious victim; see Fritz Breithaupt, “Rituals of
Trauma: How theMedia Fabricated 9/11,” inMedia Representations of September 11, ed. Steven
Chermak, Frankie Y. Bailey, andMichelle Brown (Westport, Conn., 2003), pp. 67–81.
48. In Dominick LaCapra’s terms, one could say that the stealing of speech of the victim and
thereby from the victim is parallel to the move from “loss” to “absence” for the victim. Once
someone else uses the language of trauma, the speech cements the wound, the loss, converts it to a
fact, a permanent absence. LaCapra writes: “When loss is converted into (or encrypted in an
indiscriminately generalized rhetoric of) absence, one faces the impasse of endlessmelancholy,
impossiblemourning, and indeterminable aporia in which any process of working through the
past and its historical losses is foreclosed or prematurely aborted” (Dominick LaCapra, “Trauma,
Absence, Loss,”Critical Inquiry 25 [Summer 1999]: 698).
science that applies its preconceived notions instead of observing. Other
forums like the popularmedia are evenmore likely to simply apply a notion
such as trauma.47 When it was pointed out to him that the phenomena did
not ﬁt one of his general concepts, Hegel is supposed to have said: “Somuch
worse for the phenomena.”
Secondly, what Moritz indicates to us is that despite everything even a
terrible wound can potentially, but by no means necessarily, become a
source of strength for the survivor. As a technology of reversal, trauma
converts accounts of certain horrors into strengths. This means it is struc-
turally not necessary that the trauma is one’s own or is authentic. Fabri-
cating one’s traumatic past or speaking on behalf of another’s trauma can
have the same strengthening eﬀect as “real” trauma, especially because
trauma today serves as the icon of authenticity. Put diﬀerently, evoking
the speech of trauma harbors a promise for those who speak of it: self-
institutionalization. And that is precisely why this form of speech ought to
be reserved for the victim. Otherwise, the temptation for those who speak
on behalf of the victim to gain that momentum of self-institutionalization
and thus to take it away from the victim will be enormous, probably irre-
sistible.
Whoever speaks of someone else’s traumawalks a thin line between sup-
porting the weak, giving them a voice, and infantilizing the weak, stealing
their right to speak and thus disempowering them where there is a chance
for self-empowerment.48Any power, whether institutional, legal, academic,
professional, therapeutic, political, psychological or linguistic, ought to be
reserved for those whose trauma is at issue. To be sure, it would be worse
not to speak of suﬀering. The witness, the friend, the helper, the advocate
can and should talk about what they have witnessed; trauma itself one can-
not witness. There is indeed an ethics of trauma. It is that of noninstitu-
tionalization. The constant inherent danger in trauma studies is that it
institutionalizes and strengthens itself at the cost of those whose care has
been entrusted to it and who thus lose the ability to strengthen themselves.
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